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I. Introduction 
 According to Transparency International in 2006 out of the 30 major exporters in 
the world, China was ranked the second worst in terms of bribery (Transparency 
International, 2006).  Not surprisingly, as a response to the massive amount of corruption 
China has developed business practice around a system of personal relations and mutual 
obligation.  This is called ‘guanxi’ in Chinese or literally connections.  What is often seen 
as simple bribery or cronyism is acceptable business practice in China among both 
private businesses and the government (So and Walker, 2005).  While guanxi can be used 
for explicitly illegal purposes, it can also be used to improve relations between businesses 
and as a result it is sometimes difficult to determine the legality of guanxi. 
 The institution of guanxi networks at its most basic level can be defined as 
interpersonal connections between people who share a group status, geographical 
location or are related to a common person.  However, guanxi can also exist between 
frequent business associates or persons introduced through someone else in the network 
(Fan, 2002).  These connections between people are in turn often used for business.  
Many Chinese are especially risk averse in their business relationships and prefer 
spending significant amounts of time and money establishing connections; it is the time 
and money spent building and maintaining these social networks that truly defines guanxi 
(So and Walker, 2005).  One way to increase one’s own network is to give gifts.  By 
accepting gifts or services the involved person is obligated to perform an undefined 
service in the future.  The World Bank and the OECD consider many of these 
transactions bribery and it is also true that many people in China openly accept bribes and 
use the guanxi label to try and legitimize their activity.  The main difference in many of 
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these cases is that the emphasis is on building relationships and the gift giving is not a 
fee-for-service bribe; many other countries often have well known ‘prices’ for such 
commodities as import licenses or construction contracts (Schramm and Taube, 2003) 
 This paper examines the incentives created by guanxi networks.  Giving the 
current conditions of missing institutions and corruption in China, guanxi networks offer 
a transaction cost reducing solution to both domestic and foreign businesses operating in 
China.  The Chinese government’s lack of oversight in operational procedure allows for 
government officials at all levels to abuse power.  Extortion from the government as well 
as bribes to bend laws are both commonplace.  Normally this would lead to a prisoner’s 
dilemma scenario between businesses and government; however guanxi networks alter 
the incentives to cooperate in the long run.  Incentives between businesses are also 
improved by guanxi networks because trust and long-term relationships are at the center 
of guanxi. 
II. Guanxi Social Networks 
 Using social networks as business connections is hardly unique to China; many 
former communist states have similar networks.  This is partially due to conditions of 
shortages and a state system of favoritism.  Russia, for example, also has similar social 
networks called blat (Michailova and Worm, 2003).  As previously noted social networks 
like guanxi in China are much more than simple bribes; they are a system to insure 
continuity of relationships and trust.  For example, suppose in the following scenario 
person A needs a favor and he asks person B, a member of his network.  Person B is 
obligated to help person A and if he cannot he will pass this request on to person C.  Thus, 
even though person A does not know person C directly they are under obligation to help 
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each other through person B.  In this case, both person A and person B are indebted to 
person C.  Guanxi also involves many other activities that are meant to build trust among 
people in the guanxi network; such activities include having meals together, gift giving, 
visiting an associates place of business, hiring the offspring of an associate or doing a 
favor for them in a time of need.  Guanxi cannot be built with one time bribes; many 
individuals spend years building these networks of connections and view them as social 
capital (Dunfee and Warren, 2001).  Since guanxi are relationships at the individual level 
businesses can only use guanxi through their employees.  If an employee leaves his job, 
his former company will lose access to his contacts as well.  This is sometimes a concern 
with businesses because the resources spent building guanxi are very high.  Building 
guanxi does not simply mean a small meal or gift every few years; households will 
typically spend between 10% and 20% of disposable income for strengthening guanxi 
networks.  The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption determined that 
businessmen spent five percent of investments in mainland China solely on gifts to 
maintain guanxi networks (Schramm and Taube, 2003).  In addition to monetary costs 
there is also the time cost of building and maintaining guanxi networks.  To truly build 
close connections to business associates, you must also show concern over their personal 
lives outside of business deals (Fan, 2002). 
Guanxi relationships can be broadly categorized into two areas: business to 
government relationships and business to business relationships (Fan, 2002).  Guanxi 
relations between the business and government is often associated with corruption and is 
when a business person uses his or her guanxi connections to someone in the government 
for gain.  Business to business relationships are relationships between two companies that 
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have a favored status with each other.  The two types of relationships are analyzed 
separately in the following sections. 
III. Business to Government Relationships  
 In the early 1990s Lai Changxing was able to set up a successful smuggling 
business in the port town of Xiamen located in southeastern China (Menshausen, 2005).  
The front of his company was registered as an electronics import company and when he 
formed the company he invited many provincial and city leaders, high level customs 
officials, tax officials and directors of the state-owned banks to an expensive banquet.  He 
also spent much time establishing good relations by giving “hongbao”; hongbao are red 
envelopes containing money given during festivals and are sometimes used to disguise 
bribes.  In addition throughout the 1980s Lai had been a restaurant owner and had built 
up good connections with the head of the public security bureau in the province as well as 
with the head of the customs in the town by often treating the two to free dinners at his 
restaurant.  In return for these gifts officials in Xiamen overlooked the fact that Lai’s 
company did not have any permits to import goods, tax officials provided fake receipts 
for tax purposes, the state-owned banks provided letters of credit, and harbor authorities 
let his cargo pass without inspection.  His company was even directly shielded from 
investigation by the vice-minister of public security.  Lai Changxing took advantage of 
his connections to protect his illegal business from government prosecution; in addition 
he used his connections to avoid such costs as import permits and taxes.  These guanxi 
networks are able to operate in such a manner because of the system setup by the Chinese 
Communist Party in which the party has the ability to override legal and regulatory 
 5
constraints (Lieberthal, 2005).  Since the rule of law is weak in China, who you know is 
much more important than regulations and what you know.   
While guanxi connections can be used to bend laws, they can also be used to 
protect businesses from extortion by corrupt government officials. One private company 
in China hired the son of a government official as an administrative assistant in order to 
use his father’s connections as protection (Xin and Pearce, 1996).  The tax auditing 
bureau decided to audit this company for tax fraud; in China there are no standardized 
rules on how to keep financial records and the auditing bureau has a lot of power in 
finding fault with tax records.  If the company was found guilty of tax fraud they would 
face thousands of RMB in fines and potentially lose their business license.  The head of 
the company called in the government official’s son.  The official’s son setup a lunch 
with the tax auditors.  After drinks and food at an expensive restaurant the head of the 
accounting department praised the company on its efficient accounting system and all 
charges were quickly forgotten.  Building good relations with local government officials 
is vital for businesses in China.  Poor relations with local officials will not only mean the 
possibility of extortion but also the possibility government services will be denied.  Basic 
services such as running water and electricity can be shutoff.  In addition, since the banks 
in China are state owned, gift giving to the right officials can change the eligibility of a 
firm in seeking loans.  
Guanxi networks can often act as substitutes for formal institutional networks.  In 
countries without strong legal or regulatory environments abuse of power is common and 
personal connections are substitutes for reliable government and the rule of law.  This 
was an example of how a private business used guanxi connections to lower costs of 
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extortion by government officials.  A study by Xin and Pierce (1996) finds that unlike 
state-owned companies, private companies are more likely to report that their business 
connections are useful as a defense against threats and will generally report more 
connections with individuals in government positions.  Private businesses often resort to 
guanxi networks because corruption in the government is still widespread in China and 
the power structure of the Chinese government allow for certain individuals to 
accumulate unchecked power.  Although some officials are periodically arrested and 
given exemplary punishment, the central government in China has only made a half-
hearted attempt at cracking down on corruption (Lieberthal, 2005).  One of the major 
problems is that oversight mechanisms are not independent; in fact they are often 
subordinate to local officials they are tasked to watch (Sun, 2005).  Furthermore, officials 
at every level have a large degree of autonomy.  Every official is highly vulnerable to 
those above but, at the same time, can act like a dictator toward those below.  Punishment 
is unlikely in this type of bureaucracy because the officials are able to skew information 
that goes onto higher levels (Lieberthal, 2005).  
 While having connections to people inside the government can be a deterrent 
against extortion it can have other benefits as well.  The chairman of an Australian 
company seeking investment opportunities in China was a close friend with the local 
executive of a state-owned enterprise (Fan, 2002).  In turn, this executive was close 
friends with key government officials.  Throughout the entire negotiation process the 
local executive was able to relay information on how the government viewed the 
Australian company’s project.  The chairman of the company was able to adjust his 
project accordingly and his project was successful.  Guanxi relationships can have other 
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positive effects as well such as acting as a shortcut through government bureaucracies 
and even limiting government inefficiencies.  During the era of state planned economy, 
China faced many shortages in consumer goods.  The use of guanxi relationships could 
allow for citizens to obtain hard to find consumer goods (Michailova andWorm, 2003).  
If the government sets up a queue system for access to a rare commodity, individuals 
with guanxi connections are able to pay for a better position in the queue.  By having 
friends in government willing to allow this type of deal a more efficient solution is 
reached; people who value the rare commodity are willing to pay extra for it (Lui, 1985).  
Business to government guanxi relations are also defined by the imbalance of power 
between the two sides.  While the government has both the power to punish or aid the 
business, with the correct relationship they can both benefit. 
IV. Modeling Business to Government Relationships 
 The relationship between an abusive government official in a position of power 
and a private business in a one-time game is modeled in figure 1.   Assume that the cost 
of the bribe is lower then the extortion cost (c < e); if the cost of the bribe was higher than 
the cost of extortion than the business would prefer getting extorted rather than to pay a 
bribe.  Since we know that businesses would rather pay a bribe to stop extortion we must 
assume the cost of the bribe is lower than the cost of extortion.  In addition the cost of the 
bribe must be equal or greater than the fraction of extortion gained by the government 
officials, otherwise the government officials would much rather extort than to bribe (c => 
p(e)).  Finally, it should be noted that the fraction of extortion gained by corrupt 
government officials is less than the full extortion cost incurred by the business (p(e) < e).  
When a corrupt government official decides to extort the business, the cost of extortion 
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incurred by the business does not always equal the amount gained by the official because 
some of the extortion tactics that the officials employ are not necessarily money based 
and it is costly to extort.  Although the chance of punishment is quite small since the 
actual punishments are quite severe, the government officials still do factor in the 
expected outcomes.  According to Chinese law, accepting an amount of more than 
100,000 RMB can result in anywhere from 10 years to life imprisonment or the death 
penalty along with confiscation of property.  Punishment is increased when the officials 
actively demand a bribe (Menhausen, 2005).  Keep in mind the tax auditing case in China: 
if the auditing officials reported tax fraud the company would face fines and could lose 
their business license.  The corrupt officials will earn nothing from a business losing their 
license but the cost of losing a license is a big cost for the business.  Other extortion 
techniques, depending on the level of corruption of the officials, include inflating fines 
and pocketing a portion of the money or even the possibility of not reporting cases to 
higher authorities and pocketing all of the fines charged to businesses.  The business can 
choose between bribing the government or not bribing and simultaneously the 
government can choose between extorting and not extorting.  It is possible for the 
government official to be opportunistic and extort even after accepting bribes (bottom left 
cell) and also possible that the government official will be honest and not extort at all 
even without the business paying a bribe (top right cell).  When the business does not get 
extorted and does not offer a bribe, the business keeps all of its own profits and the 
government official gets no payoffs (top right cell).  If the business offers a bribe and the 
official decides not to extort then the business gets to keep profits minus the cost of the 
bribe and the government officials get the full value of the bribe (bottom right cell).  The 
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final possible outcome is for the businesses to not offer bribes and the officials to extort 
the business (top left cell). 
In this simultaneous one-shot game the business is always wiser to not offer 
bribes and the official’s dominant strategy is to extort because the business’s bribe will 
not necessarily stop corrupt officials from engaging in opportunistic behavior and the 
officials have no disincentive to extortion.  This is a case of the prisoner’s dilemma; the 
government officials and the business owners are collectively better off with the officials 
not extorting and the business offering bribes, but because the incentives against bribing 
and the incentives for extorting it is in both parties’ self interest to not cooperate.  The 
Nash equilibrium is for businesses to not offer bribes and for the government officials to 
extort the business.  Since this is a one-time game, there is nothing stopping the 
government from continuing to extort the company even after accepting bribes.  Similarly 
if the government decides not to extort the business there is a chance the business will not 
offer bribes to the officials and they will get nothing.  When guanxi networks are added 
to the game the payoffs will change slightly because of the emphasis on building long 
term relationships.  
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  A repeated game is represented in figure 2.  Businesses are now separated 
between those who have guanxi connections and those who do not have connections.  
Similar to the previous model it is assumed the extortion cost is bigger than the cost of 
bribe otherwise firms would prefer extortion (c < e).   Additionally, the value of future 
guanxi is worth more than fraction of extortion and also worth more than the gain from 
bribe (p(e) < f and c < f respectively).  From the business’s point of view guanxi is not 
only a deterrent against future extortion but also the lowering cost of information, and 
perhaps discounts on bureaucratic licenses, availability of loans and the easing of 
regulatory laws.  From the point of view of the corrupt government official this means 
regular gifts from businesses.  The payoffs for a business with no connections in this 
example are the same as businesses who decide not to bribe the government in the 
previous example of a one shot game.  If a business uses its connections it will incur the 
cost of the bribe, or in this case the cost of using connections.  If the government does not 
extort the business and the business offers a gift to the officials the business will build 
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guanxi and establish a better relationship with the government officials in the future 
(bottom right cell).  As previously stated good relations with local officials is more 
important in China than in many other places in the world because of the power structure 
of the government and the amount of autonomy local officials are given.  This was the 
case with smuggling in Xiamen; Lai Changxing was able to obtain tax exemptions and 
loans from government banks and also bent the law in his favor.  Another possibility is 
that the business uses its connections and the government officials are opportunistic and 
decide to also extort the company (bottom left cell).  In this case the business and the 
government will both be worse off.  The business has to pay for trying to establish guanxi 
and additionally suffers the cost of extortion.  The government officials will gain a 
portion from extortion and keep gifts given in the guise of building connections but will 
lose guanxi.  The loss of guanxi means the officials are forfeiting future gifts and favors 
given to build guanxi.  And if one of the business owners has connections to a more 
senior official it could mean that this government official will face retribution from above.  
Another potential consequence is the loss of reputation.  If the official acts 
opportunistically the business with guanxi connections to other people can spread the 
word about the untrustworthiness of this official.  This is harmful to the official in 
attracting business to the area or detrimental to business relations if the official is 
involved in a state owned enterprise.   
There are now two Nash equilibria in this repeated scenario.  The first equilibrium 
is the one where the government officials extort businesses that do not have connections 
and the businesses will not use their connections.  The second equilibrium is the one 
where the officials will choose not to extort the businesses and simultaneously the 
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business will choose to use their connections.  The businesses with no connections will 
be facing many more bureaucratic obstacles.  There are fewer incentives for government 
officials to not extort these companies.  These companies can try to bribe the officials but 
as we saw in the first example this does not stop opportunistic behavior from the 
government officials.  On the other hand, the businesses with strong guanxi connections 
to the local officials will be protected from extortion.  Opportunistic behavior is protected 
through social networks; repeated interaction will promote cooperation and both the 
business and the government officials will be better off. 
Over time one Nash equilibrium will dominate the other.  While there are two 
Nash equilibria, it is clear that one is more advantageous than the other; businesses prefer 
to build connections and to not get extorted (bottom right cell) over the other equilibrium 
of not building connections and getting extorted (top left cell).  In this case the bottom 
right Nash equilibrium is the evolutionary stable strategy; in repeated scenarios the 
bottom right equilibrium will dominate the top right equilibrium.  For example, lets 
consider a scenario where the entire population consists of either type A, or business 
people with connections (bottom right equilibrium), and type B, businesses without 
connections (top right equilibrium). The initial population in this scenario consists of 50 
percent type A and 50 percent type B.  Over multiple repetitions the population of type A 
will increase and the population of type B will decrease.  This is due to the fact that the 
expected payoffs are much higher from being type A than type B.  Over multiple 
generations while businesses that are type A will find that they have the optimal solution, 
type B will either go out of business, choose not to operate in this market or they will 
come to the conclusion that payoffs are much higher when they have connections to 
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government officials and will attempt to establish guanxi relationships with them.  Type 
Bs have low fitness; they do not survive repeated interactions in this scenario and in the 
end type As will dominate type Bs.  After multiple repetitions of this scenario the 
population of type As, initially with a population of 50 percent, will approach zero and 
the population of type Bs, initially with a population of 50 percent, will approach 100 
percent. 
  
V.  Business to Business Relationships 
 Business to business relationships are similar to business to government relations 
because both are based around the idea that repeated interaction will reduce opportunism 
and increase cooperation (Glaeser, 2000).  However in a relationship between two 
businesses one side does not have the opportunity to extort money from the other side.  
Guanxi networks in business to business relationships are more about information and 
reliability of business partners rather than protection from extortion or assurance of basic 
services.  There are two main issues involved in business to business relationships: 
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uncertainty and opportunism.  Guanxi networks are expensive to join and the upkeep 
costs associated with maintaining positive relationships with business associates is also 
high and as a result these high costs act as effective tools to reduce uncertainty among 
businesses as well as minimize opportunism. 
 Guanxi networks can lower transaction costs in the form of contact and control 
costs.  The cost of membership in one of these networks is expensive and opportunistic or 
unreliable firms will not find it profitable to join.  This is because opportunistic behavior 
will quickly ruin a business’s reputation among other members.  In addition the honoring 
or violation of a contract will also spread quickly in the network and result in a loss of 
trust among network members.  Exclusion from a guanxi network means not only the loss 
of the cost of establishing guanxi but also the increased cost of future transactions with 
the members of the network or perhaps the chance that network members will completely 
refuse to do business with the ostracized business.  Once a business has established itself 
as not opportunistic and reliable, the costs of contact, negotiation and implementation of 
transactions between network members is reduced (Schramm, 2003).  The exclusion of 
unreliable and opportunistic businesses insures that contracts have a much higher chance 
of being fulfilled when negotiated with network members.  Honoring contracts allows for 
members of the network to continue engaging in further low-cost transactions with other 
members of the network.  Thus even if two members of the network never plan on 
engaging in business in the future it is in their best interest to not act opportunistically as 
business with other network members could be affected.  Under guanxi networks 
maintaining long term business relations is thus more important than short term gains.  
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Membership into these networks is both a type of screening mechanism and signaling 
mechanism. 
VI. Modeling Business to Business Relationships 
 Businesses try to interact with non-opportunistic companies.  Untrustworthy 
companies are likely to engage in opportunism including breaking contracts or switching 
to lower cost competitors.  The cost of searching for business partners and negotiating 
contracts is time consuming so businesses try to avoid opportunistic partners.  However 
businesses do not know if other businesses are opportunistic or not and therefore without 
some sort of knowledge network they will do business with both.  Businesses are not 
opportunistic with probability (1 - p) and opportunistic with probability (p).  If a non-
opportunistic business is able to contract with another non-opportunistic business they 
will both receive a high payoff of (H).  If a non-opportunistic business contracts with an 
opportunistic business than then the non-opportunistic business will incur a cost of the 
opportunism (-L) and the opportunistic business will gain (L).  For a non-opportunistic 
business seeking an honest company the expected payoff will be [(P*H) – (1-P * L)].  
The expected payoff is the expected gain from interacting with a reliable honest business 
minus the expected loss from interacting with an opportunistic business.  However with 
guanxi networks the reliability of business partners is guaranteed.  
 The addition of guanxi networks in this interaction between two businesses is 
modeled in figure 3.  In this new model two businesses, business 1 and business 2, decide 
whether or not to set up a business agreement.  In this model a high payoff is larger than 
the gain from opportunism (H > L), the cost of signaling is lower than the high payoff (H 
> S) and the cost of the signal is higher than the gain from opportunism (S > H).  The 
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higher payoff indicates both the possibility for a long term business relationship and the 
gain in reputation that is required to stay in the guanxi network.  Although the gain from 
opportunism might be higher than the gain from a legitimate business deal in the short 
run, opportunism eliminates the chance these two businesses will interact in the future 
and the victimized business will tell others about the questionable practices of the 
opportunistic business and they will not be able to do business with the rest of the 
network again.  The cost of signaling is high because of the amount of gifts and time 
required to establish connections to others.  Although all of this gift giving might negate 
any profits from a business deal in the short run, the establishment of connections allows 
for continued trust in the long run and the reduced search cost for more business partners.  
Finally, the cost of signaling is higher than the gain from opportunism because the cost of 
signaling is high and opportunism is a one time gain.  If a business establishes a 
reputation for opportunism after spending money to make many connections the business 
will not find many willing business partners and will most likely be ostracized by 
members of the guanxi network.   
In this model Business 1 will have a probability of (p) to be not opportunistic or a 
probability of (1-p) of being opportunistic (it is assumed in this model that business 2 is 
not opportunistic).  However, businesses can now send a signal to others about their 
reliability.  The more reliable a business the bigger their guanxi network is; more people 
are willing to do business with them and they will build a reputation as reliable and not 
opportunistic.  Sending this signal requires joining a guanxi network.  Since joining a 
guanxi network takes both time and money there is a cost of signaling (S).  Once the 
business has decided whether or not it wants to join a network, other businesses can then 
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select whether or not to interact with this business.  Regardless of opportunism if the 
businesses decide not to do business both of them will receive a payout of zero.  If 
business 1 signals but business 2 decides not to do business then both businesses receive 
zero payout and business 1 also incurs the cost of the signal.  If the two businesses are 
both not opportunistic then they will receive a high payoff of H (minus the cost of the 
signal if business 1 signals).  If business 1 is opportunistic then it will have a short term 
gain of L and business 2 will incur an expensive of L.  In the case of business 1 the gain 
of L represents the gain from not fulfilling a contract or switching firms; not delivering 
goods even after payment or switching to a lower cost competitor.  For business 2 the 
loss of L represents the payment of a good without delivery, the cost of searching for a 
new reliable business partner and the cost of signing a new contract.  However, with a 
guanxi network the possibility with interaction with opportunistic companies is much 
lower.  The high cost of signaling has two effects; it not only makes it not profitable for 
opportunistic companies to join these networks and it forces companies that have already 
spent money building connections to continue good business practices to maintain a good 
reputation.  Through utilizing connections a company will only deal with other 
businesses that signal (are part of the guanxi network).  The information about a 
business’s worthiness obtained through these networks increases the expected outcome of 
businesses.  Originally the expected outcome was the expected gain minus the expected 
loss.  With guanxi networks businesses can now restrict business interactions with non-
opportunistic companies. 
Just as business to government guanxi relationships have a evolutionary stable 
solution, business to business guanxi relationships also have an evolutionary dominant 
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solution.  Businesses that are part of extensive guanxi networks will find it much easier to 
find business partners.  Although unlike the business to government scenario, one 
solution does not completely dominate the other.  It is still possible for businesses that are 
not in guanxi to find business partners.  The game tree in figure 3 allows for the 
possibility of a business that does not signal (join a guanxi network) to still find business 
partners.  However, businesses that are not part of guanxi networks will have a lot more 
trouble avoiding opportunism because they do not have the same shared information 
resources available to members of a guanxi network.  In addition, the lack of guanxi can 
be viewed negatively by others; there is a possibility a business has no guanxi 
connections because it is unreliable.  After multiple generations, businesses with guanxi 
will dominate those without guanxi.  Non-opportunistic businesses that do not have 
guanxi will slowly build it and opportunistic businesses that do not have guanxi will 
likely go out of business.  The only businesses that remain without guanxi in this scenario 
are the new businesses that have not had time to build extensive guanxi connections. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 In conclusion guanxi networks are not the most efficient solutions.  China would 
have a much more efficient economy if China had stronger contractual laws, tax codes, a 
more independent judiciary, and stronger checks on corruption.  However, given that 
China does not have a very strong rule of law, these personal networks are a fairly 
adequate solution.  Although guanxi networks can be abused for illicit gain, guanxi 
relationships between businesses and government officials can also benefit both sides and 
reduce extortion.  Guanxi relationships between businesses are also efficiency enhancing 
by reducing the transaction costs such as the search cost of finding a suitable business 
partner.  Additionally guanxi relations may solve asymmetric information issues as well; 
guanxi acts as a screening mechanism against opportunism because the reputation of a 
business is spread throughout guanxi networks and multiple interactions between 
members maintains future business relationships as well. 
 Ever since the reform and opening movement started in the late 1970’s China has 
been one of the world’s fastest growing economies.  It has managed close to 10 percent 
growth for the last few years and has managed to attract billions in foreign direct 
investment.  It is surprising that one of the world’s fastest growing economies still 
operates using such informal business practices.  However, much of this is expected to 
change in the near future, since China’s entrance into the WTO, China has started to 
make efforts to create a more business friendly and transparent atmosphere.  Nevertheless, 
guanxi networks are already an integral part of china's business culture and it remains to 
be seen how they will evolve to accommodate China’s economic future 
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